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Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3) (j) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (j ) 1 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Utah Constitution Art. VIII, Section 3 l 
ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third 
Judicial District Court, State of Utah granting summary 
judgment for the plaintiff. This case was originally appealed 
to the Utah Supreme Court which had jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Constitution Art. VIII, Section 3 and Utah Code Ann. §78-
2-2(3) (j). This matter was subsequently transferred from the 
Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4). The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-
2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
On appeal, defendants raise the following issues: 
1. Whether the district court correctly interpreted the 
language of the Agreement between the parties to release the 
plaintiff Estate from obligations relating to the repayment 
of certain "Interpartnership Loans11, while specifically 
preserving the Estate's right to its distributive share as a 
general partner of Southwest Virginia. 
2. Whether the district court correctly awarded the 
plaintiff its attorney fees incurred in pursuing this action 
as consequential damages arising from the defendants1 breach 
of the Agreement, and whether the district court abused its 
1 
discretion in determining that the amount of attorney fees and 
costs awarded was reasonable.1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by Myrne M. Collier, as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of James A. Collier 
(hereinafter the "Estate"), to recover the sum of $97,110.49 
(plus interest, costs and attorney fees) which was wrongfully 
offset against its distributive share to which it was entitled 
as the representative of James A. Collier, a general partner 
of Southwest Virginia Shopping Center Associates (hereinafter 
"Southwest Virginia"). (Complaint, R. 4) Defendant Kerry 
M. Heinz (hereinafter "Heinz") was the other general partner 
of Southwest Virginia. The rights of the parties with respect 
to the distribution of profits from Southwest Virginia is 
governed by the Partnership Agreement and by a certain 
Settlement Agreement (hereinafter the "Agreement"), dated 
Because the Order and Summary Judgment Regarding 
Attorneysf Fees was entered by the district court subsequent 
to entry of judgment on the merits of the case, the issue of 
attorney fees is the subject of a separate appeal as of the 
date of this Brief. The court entered its Order of Summary 
Judgment on the attorney fees issue on May 22, 1990, and 
defendants filed a Notice of Appeal on that issue on June 20, 
1990. The defendants have filed a Motion to Consolidate and 
Transfer Appeals in the Utah Supreme Court, requesting that 
the appeal on the attorney fees issue be transferred to this 
court and consolidated with the present appeal. Inasmuch as 
defendants addressed the attorney fees issue in their opening 
Brief, the plaintiff will also address that issue in this 
Brief, with the belief that the attorney fees appeal will 
likely be consolidated with this appeal for briefing. 
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February 12, 1988 between the Estate and Heinz, individually 
and in his capacities, inter alia, as president of Collier, 
Heinz & Associates and as the surviving general partner of 
Southwest Virginia. (Agreement, R. 100, Add. 1) The 
defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint alleging that the 
Agreement did not accurately reflect the intentions of the 
parties. Specifically, defendants alleged in their Answer 
that it was the parties intent that the Estate was to have 
released any interest it had in Southwest Virginia pursuant 
to the terms of the Agreement. (Answer, R. 19) 
The Estate filed a Motion For Summary Judgment showing 
that the terms of the Agreement accurately reflected the 
intentions of the Estate, was binding on the parties and 
established that the Estate was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. (Plaintiff's Memorandum and Exhibits thereto, 
R. 24-149) Following the filing of the Estate's Motion For 
Summary Judgment, defendants obtained new counsel who 
responded to the Estate!s Motion For Summary Judgment and 
filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The defendants 
did not dispute that the Agreement was binding arid controlling 
on this issue, but rather, argued that a portion of the 
$97,110.49 was properly offset from the Estate's distributive 
share because those funds were traceable to the repayment of 
certain "Interpartnership Loans" made by the Estate, with 
respect to which the Estate had released all interest under 
3 
the terms of the Agreement. (Defendants1 Memorandum, R. 183-
196) In support of this contention defendants pointed to a 
small portion of Section 5 of the Agreement. (Defendants1 
Memorandum, R. 191) 
The Estate filed a Reply Memorandum and demonstrated that 
the portion of Section 5 quoted by the defendants in their 
memorandum was taken out of context, and that when read as a 
whole, the Agreement clearly provided that the Estate was 
entitled to a 50% interest in the general partners1 
distributive share from Southwest Virginia, regardless of the 
source of those funds. (Plaintiff's Memorandum, R. 233-266) 
Following oral argument on the Motion For Summary Judgment, 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Estate and against the defendants awarding the Estate the sum 
of $97,110.49, plus interest. (Order, R. 305) 
In addition to asking the court to grant summary 
judgment on its claim for the $97,110.49, the Estate also 
asked the court to award the Estate its attorney fees incurred 
in pursuing this litigation. As it relates to this appeal, 
the Estate fs claim for attorney fees was based upon two 
theories: 1) pursuant to the indemnification provisions of 
the Agreement; and 2) as consequential damages arising from 
breach of the Agreement. At the summary judgment hearing, the 
court denied the Estatefs request for attorney fees based upon 
the indemnification provisions of the Agreement. However, the 
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court reserved its decision regarding attorney fees based upon 
the consequential damages theory, requesting the parties to 
submit supplemental memoranda on that issue. (Transcript of 
Summary Judgment hearing, pp. 49-51 (hereafter "Tr. ") ) . 
Following submission by the parties of supplemental memoranda 
(Supplemental Memoranda, R. 275, 309) the court ruled in favor 
of the Estate granting the Estate attorney fees as 
consequential damages as a result of breach of the Agreement 
in the amount of $18,579.00, and costs in the amount of an 
additional $92.50, plus interest. (Order re Attorney Fees, R. 
) 
Following entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
Estate, the defendants paid to the Estate an additional sum 
of $58,266.29 (plus interest related to this sum) which the 
defendants then conceded was owing to the Estate.2 The 
defendants thereafter filed this appeal alleging that they 
were not required to pay to the Estate the remaining 
$38,844.20 and related interest (the difference between the 
$97,110.49 judgment and the $58,266.29 thereafter paid to the 
Estate) inasmuch as that figure represented funds whose source 
could be traced to the repayment by Heinz of the 
Interpartnership Loans, and asserting that under the terms of 
2
 The defendants had initially paid to the Estate the sum 
of $53,080.11 as a general partner distributive share of 
profits of Southwest Virginia. The accounting involved in 
this transaction is set forth in more detail, infra. 
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the Agreement the Estate was not entitled to receive a 
distribution from Southwest Virginia that had the repayment 
of an Interpartnership Loan as its source. The defendants 
have also appealed the award of attorney fees to the Estate. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to his death in 1980, James A. Collier had 
extensive business dealings with Heinz involving various 
limited partnerships, including Southwest Virginia, in which 
James A. Collier and Heinz were partners. (Collier Affidavit, 
13, R. 50) From time-to-time loans were made by and between 
some or all of the limited partnerships (hereinafter 
"Interpartnership Loans"). (Agreement, R. 100, Add. 1) By 
reason of the Interpartnership Loans, some of the limited 
partnerships were debtor partnerships (hereinafter the "Debtor 
Partnerships") owing money to some of the other limited 
partnerships which were creditor partnerships (hereinafter the 
"Creditor Partnerships"). (Supplemental Affidavit of Kenneth 
J. Hanni, [^8, R. 261). Over a period of time following the 
death of James A. Collier in 1980, the Estate advanced 
approximately $907,331.30 which was applied on certain 
Interpartnership Loans and received by various of the Creditor 
Partnerships. (Agreement, Section 5, R. 100, Add. 1; 
Supplemental Affidavit of Kenneth J. Hanni, 58, R. 2 61) 
Heinz advanced similar sums for payment on certain 
Interpartnership Loans which were also received by various of 
6 
the Creditor Partnerships. (Supplemental Affidavit of Kenneth 
J. Hanni, J8, R. 261). The reason the Estate and Heinz 
advanced said monies for payment on the Interpartnership Loans 
was that the Debtor Partnerships were unable to pay their 
debts to certain Creditor Partnerships at the times those the 
Creditor Partnerships were being wound down and related 
distributions were being made. (Supplemental Affidavit of 
Kenneth J. Hanni, f8, R. 261). 
Shortly after the death of James A. Collier, probate 
proceedings were commenced in the Second Judicial District 
Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah, Probate No. 
2890, and Myrne M. Collier was appointed as Personal 
Representative of the Estate on or about February 7, 1980. 
(Collier Affidavit, Jl, R. 50) Heinz, Southwest Virginia, 
and others subsequently filed certain claims against the 
Estate in the probate proceedings relating to matters in which 
both James A. Collier and Heinz were involved, including 
matters relating to the Interpartnership Loans. (Affidavit 
of Kenneth J. Hanni, 53, R. 56) The Estate claimed that it 
was entitled to recover the $907,331.30 advanced by it, and 
the defendants agreed that the Estate "may be entitled to 
recover part of such amount on various theories", such as the 
subrogation of the Estate to the claims of the Creditor 
Partnerships. (Agreement, Section 5, R. 100, Add. 1; 
Supplemental Affidavit of Kenneth J. Hanni, J9, R. 261). 
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Myrne M. Collier, as James A. Collier's widow and 
Personal Representative of the Estate, spent extensive time 
and incurred substantial legal costs in an effort to avoid 
litigation and settle the business dealings of her late 
husband, particularly certain differences relating to the 
probate claims filed by Heinz. (Collier Affidavit, 54, R. 
50) • The Agreement was the product of extensive negotiations 
between the parties thereto, with Myrne M. Collier and Heinz 
each represented by separate counsel throughout the 
negotiations. (Collier Affidavit, 55, R. 50; Hanni Affidavit, 
f4, R. 56; Edwards Affidavit, f3, R. 68) 
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the Estate 
released any and all claims it had with respect to future 
repayment of the Interpartnership Loans, i.e., the right to 
recover the $907,331.30 the Estate had advanced. (Agreement, 
Section 5, R. 100, Add. 1) The Agreement further provides 
that the Estate has a "50% interest in the aggregate General 
Partner Distribution Interests" in Southwest Virginia. 
(Agreement, Section 2, R. 100, Add. 1) The Agreement further 
provides that "nothing in this Agreement shall affect the 
Estate's right, title, and interest as a limited partner" in 
Southwest Virginia. (Agreement, Section 3, R. 100, Add. 1) 
In addition, pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the 
Estate released Heinz, Southwest Virginia and others from any 
and all claims, liabilities, etc., arising from facts 
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occurring prior to the date of the Agreement, but specifically 
excepting the right of the Estate to receive its general 
partner and limited partner distribution interests from 
Southwest Virginia. (Agreement, Section 8, R. 100, Add. 1) 
The Limited Partnerships, including Southwest Virginia 
released the Estate from any and all obligations to make 
further payments on the Interpartnership Loans on behalf of 
the Debtor Partnerships. (Agreement, Section 10, R. 100, Add. 
1) Heinz also agreed to indemnify and hold the Estate 
harmless from any and all claims and liabilities which were 
connected in any way with Interpartnership Loans. (Agreement, 
Section 5, R. 100, Add. 1) 
In approximately late 1987 or early 1988, the decision 
was made by Heinz, as the sole surviving general partner of 
Southwest Virginia to sell certain assets, collect the 
Interpartnership Loan debt and make a distribution to the 
general and limited partners. (Semken Affidavit, f3, R. 197) 
Southwest Virginia, as a Creditor Partnership was owed the 
sum -of $194,220.98 from one or more Debtor Partnerships. 
(Semken Affidavit, and Exhibits A and B thereto, R. 197) 
Heinz caused the $194,220.98 receivable owing to Southwest 
Virginia to be repaid by deducting one-half of that amount 
($97,110.49) from each of the distributive shares of both 
Heinz and the Estate as general partners of Southwest 
Virginia. (Semken Affidavit and Exhibits thereto, R. 197) 
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The distributive share of the Estate was offset by $97,110.49 
in spite of the express language of the Agreement which 
provides that the Estate is released from any further 
obligations to make payments on the Interpartnership Loans on 
behalf of the Debtor Partnerships, and which provides that the 
Estate is entitled to a 50% distributive share of the general 
partners1 interest in Southwest Virginia. (Agreement, 
Sections 2, 5, and 8, R. 100, Add. 1) 
The relationships described above between the Estate and 
the limited partnerships (including Southwest Virginia) is 
illustrated as follows: 
10 

















This i s the r igh t to repayment released by the Esta te , 
** Defendants claim the Esta te released pa r t of these 
Partner Dis t r ibu t ions . 
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The following is a summary of the accounting illustrating 
the dispute at issue in this appeal: 
The Estatefs Accounting: 
The Estate has shown that the following is a correct 
accounting of the transaction at issue. 
Cash from sales of assets $1,429,000.00 
Cash from repayment 
of Interpartnership 
Loans by Heinz 
Total Assets 
Less limited partners 
capital distribution 
1 9 4 , 2 2 0 . 
$ 1 , 6 2 3 , 2 2 0 , 
( 8 7 2 . 2 6 8 , 
$ 7 5 0 , 9 5 2 , 
x , 
. 9 8 
. 9 8 
. 0 0 ) 
. 9 8 
. 2 0 
Total to be distributed 
2 0% to be distributed 
to the Estate as general 
partner (1/2 of 40% general 
partner distribution) $ 150,190.60 
Amount paid on original 
distribution (53,080.11) 
Amount awarded on summary 
judgment $ 97,110.49 
Amount paid following 
summary judgment (58,266.29) 
(undisputed amount) 
Amount still owed $ 38,844.20 * 
(plus interest) 
This figure constitutes principal only. Interest 
can be readily calculated based upon the decision 
of the district court. 
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Defendants' Accounting: 
The Defendants argue that the following reflects the 
correct handling of the transaction at issue. 
Cash on hand from sale 
of assets 




Less limited partners 
capital distribution 
Total to be distributed 
Less funds derived from 
repayment of Interpartner-
ship Loans 
Total from which the 
Estatef s general partners 
distributive share may be 
derived 
2 0% general partners 
distributive share to 
the Estate 
Less amount paid as 
distribution to Estate 
as a limited partner which 
was derived from repayment 
of Interpartnership Loans 












Paid to Estate 
at original distribution 
Paid to the Estate after 
summary judgment 
Total paid to the Estate 










This is in dispute. The Estate claims it is 
entitled to a 50% share of the general partner 
distribution from any and all sources, including 
monies from repayment of the Interpartnership Loans 
by Heinz. Defendants claim the Estate is only 
entitled to distribution of monies that can be 
traced to sources other than repayment of 
Interpartnership Loans. Consequently, when 
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calculating the amount due the Estate as its 20% 
general partner distributive share under defendants1 
theory, the $194,220.98 which was derived from the 
repayment of the Interpartnership Loan must be 
subtracted out. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The judgment of. the district court can be affirmed 
by looking solely at the clear, unambiguous language of the 
Agreement. In addition, undisputed, extrinsic evidence of 
the intentions of the parties was also presented to the 
district court which supports the courtfs decision, and should 
also be considered by this court on appeal. 
II. The clear, unambiguous language of the Agreement, 
as well as defendants1 own accounting clearly established that 
the Estate released only its right to be subrogated to the 
interests of the Creditor Partnerships and to receive direct 
repayment from the Debtor Partnerships of payments made by the 
Estate on Interpartnership Loans, and did not release any 
portion of its distributive share from Southwest Virginia. 
The district court correctly awarded damages to the Estate in 
the amount of $97,110.49. 
III. Defendants1 claim that the Estate was overpaid 
$4,257.04 as part of its distributive share as a limited 
partner of Southwest Virginia because that sum was derived 
from the repayment of Interpartnership Loans was not raised 
14 
in the court below, and is thus an improper subject for 
appeal. In addition, that claim specifically contradicts an 
express term of the Agreement which provides that nothing in 
the Agreement shall in any way affect the Estate's right to 
its distributive share as a limited partner of Southwest 
Virginia. 
IV. The Estate was properly awarded its attorney fees 
as consequential damages arising from defendants1 breach of 
the Agreement. It was clearly foreseeable and within the 
contemplation of the parties that a significant breach of the 
Agreement would result in litigation and the payment of 
substantial attorney fees. The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in finding that the attorney fees and costs 
requested by the Estate were reasonable. The circumstances 
of this litigation support the determination by the district 
court that the fees awarded were reasonable. In addition, the 
defendants presented no evidence to contradict or dispute the 
evidence presented by the Estate concerning the reasonableness 
of the attorney fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Intention Of The Parties Can Be Determined By 
Looking At The Language Of The Agreement, Giving 
Effect To All Of Its Terms, And By The Undisputed 
Evidence Presented To the District Court. 
In interpreting the Agreement, the court should first 
look to the text of the Agreement itself, taking into 
15 
consideration all of its terms and provisions. As recently 
stated by this court: 
Where questions arise in the 
interpretation of an agreement, the first 
source of inquiry is within the document 
itself. It should be looked at in its 
entirety and in accordance with its 
purpose. All of its parts should be 
given effect insofar as that is possible. 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 
1357, 1359 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Larrabee v. Royal Dairy 
Products Co., 614 P.2d 160 (Utah 1980). Likewise, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated in L.D.S. Hospital v. Capital Life 
Insurance Co. , 765 P. 2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) (emphasis 
added): 
The interpretation of a written contract 
may be a question of law determined by 
the words in the agreement. In this 
regard, we recently stated that a 
cardinal rule in construing the contract 
is to give effect to the intentions of 
the parties and, if possible, these 
intentions should be gleaned from an 
examination of the text of the contract 
itself. Additionally, it is axiomatic 
that a contract should be interpreted so 
as to harmonize all of its provisions and 
all of its terms, which terms should be 
given effect if it is possible to do so. 
When a district court interprets contractual language as a 
matter of law, the decision of the district court will be 
affirmed "so long as the contract terms are complete, clear, 
and unambiguous." Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc. v. Domcoy 
Investors, 733 P.2d 128, 129 (Utah 1987). 
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The Agreement at issue in this case is clear and 
unambiguous, and the district court could certainly have 
reached its decision by looking only at the Agreement itself, 
and by harmonizing all of its provisions. Likewise, on 
appeal, this court should affirm the decision of the district 
court by examining all of the terms and provisions of the 
Agreement. 
Although the district court was justified in ruling as 
it did by looking solely at the terms of the Agreement, the 
district court also had before it certain undisputed, 
extrinsic evidence of the understanding of the parties to the 
Agreement. For* example, evidence was presented to the 
district court, and will be discussed in more detail in 
Section II, infra, that the accounting performed by 
defendants1 own accountant, Michael Semken, contradicts the 
interpretation of the Agreement which defendants argued in 
the court below and now reassert on appeal. (See Hanni 
Affidavit, R. 56, Add. 2) Likewise, various affidavits were 
presented in the summary judgment proceedings before the 
district court concerning the circumstances surrounding the 
execution of the Agreement, such as the relationship and 
various business dealings between James A. Collier, his 
Estate, Heinz, Southwest Virginia and various other 
partnerships, and the extensive nature and involvement of 
counsel in the negotiation and execution of the Agreement. 
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(See Hanni Affidavit, R. 56; Edwards Affidavit, R. 68; 
Supplemental Affidavit of Kenneth J. Hanni, R. 261) This 
evidence was largely undisputed, and the district court was 
entitled to consider this evidence in ruling on the Estate's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Indeed, the Grounds For 
Decision Concerning Summary Judgment indicate that the court 
considered "the pleadings, together with the affidavits on 
file herein, and the admissions of defendants through their 
counsel made at the hearing on this matter" in reaching its 
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the Estate. 
(R. 3 02) Consequently, this court should also consider the 
extrinsic, undisputed evidence presented by the parties in 
the district court in ruling on this appeal. Furthermore, 
where the district court looks to extrinsic evidence of the 
intentions of the parties in interpreting a contract, 
deference must be given to the decision of the district court 
on appeal. Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P. 2d 714, 716 (Utah 
1985). 
II. The District Court Properly Determined That The 
Estate Was Entitled To 50% Of The General Partners 
Distributive Share Prom Southwest Virginia, And 
Properly Granted Judgment In Favor Of The Estate 
For $97,110.49. 
As previously discussed in the Statement of Facts and 
set forth in the accounting at page 12, supra, the narrow 
issue involved on appeal is whether the Estate is entitled to 
a full 50% of the general partners distributive share of 
18 
Southwest Virginia, or whether the Estate's distributive share 
must be reduced to the extent those funds are traceable to the 
repayment of Interpartnership Loans. The positions of the 
parties can best be explained by an examination of the diagram 
set forth at page 11, supra. 
The diagram describes four separate steps in the history 
of the transactions at issue. Step 1 reflects the 
Interpartner-ship Loan made by Southwest Virginia as a 
Creditor Partnership to a Debtor Partnership. When the 
decision was made to collect the debt owing to Southwest 
Virginia, the Debtor Partnership to which Southwest Virginia 
had loaned money was not in a position to repay the debt. 
Consequently, the repayment had to come from either Heinz or 
the Estate, as the two general partners of the Debtor 
Partnership. Inasmuch as the Estate had previously been 
released from that obligation pursuant to the terms of the 
Agreement (Agreement f 10, R. 100, Add. 1) the burden fell 
upon Heinz to make the repayment. Thus, in step 2, the Estate 
asserts that Heinz should have paid the entire amount of the 
Interpartnership Loan obligation ($194,220.98) to Southwest 
Virginia. Instead, Heinz attempted to repay the obligation 
by deducting one-half of $194,220.98 ($97,110.49) from the 
distributive share of each general partner, Heinz and the 
Estate. The Estate successfully argued before the district 
court that Heinz wrongfully offset the $97,110.49 loan 
19 
repayment from the Estatefs share because the Estate had been 
released pursuant to the Agreement. In step 3 Heinz would be 
entitled to receive repayment from the Debtor Partnership of 
the $194,220.98 which Heinz paid to Southwest Virginia on the 
Debtor Partnership's behalf. Heinz thus becomes subrogated 
to the right of Southwest Virginia to collect that debt from 
the Debtor Partnership. The Estate asserts that it is this 
right to repayment of Interpartnership Loans to which it was 
subrogated because of previous payments the Estate made to 
Creditor Partnerships that the Estate released in paragraph 
5 of the Agreement. Step 4 involves the distribution of 
profits to the general and limited partners of Southwest 
Virginia. The Estate asserts that pursuant to the terms of 
the partnership and the Agreement, the Estate is entitled to 
50% of the general partners1 distributive share, plus any 
share to which it is entitled as a limited partner of 
Southwest Virginia. Defendants assert that because the Estate 
released any right to repayment of Interpartnership Loans in 
paragraph 5 of the Agreement, the Estate is not entitled to 
receive any distribution under step 4 which can be traced to 
the repayment of Interpartnership Loans. Thus, the issue on 
appeal is whether the Estate agreed to a reduction of its 
distributive share from Southwest Virginia to the extent those 
funds could be traced to the repayment of Interpartnership 
Loans by Heinz, or whether the Estate only gave up its right 
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to subrogation to the rights of the Creditor Partnerships to 
recover the Interpartnership Loan payments it had advanced on 
behalf of the Debtor Partnerships. 
The decision of the district court awarding the Estate 
its full distributive share is fully supported by the plain, 
unambiguous language of the Agreement. As part of the 
Agreement, the Estate released its right to participate in 
distributions from certain partnerships. However, the 
Agreement specifically states that the Estate is entitled to 
a full 50% interest in the general partner distribution 
interests in certain partnerships (including Southwest 
Virginia). Section 2 of the Agreement states in pertinent 
part: 
General Partner Interests In Limited 
Partnerships. Those limited partnerships 
in which Collier and Heinz were the only 
general partners prior to Collierfs death 
are hereinafter referred to as the 
"Limited Partnerships." The Estate has 
never been a general partner of any of 
the Limited Partnerships, but it has or 
may have a right to participate in 
distributions allocable to the general 
partners (herein referred to as "General 
Partner Distribution Interests"). The 
Estate hereby relinquishes any and all 
General Partner Distribution Interests 
which it has or may have in any or all of 
the Limited Partnerships except those 
described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto 
(the "Retained Limited Partnerships"). 
[Southwest Virginia is described on 
Exhibit "A"]. With respect to the 
retained Limited Partnerships, the 
Estate, Heinz, and each of the Retained 
Limited Partnerships agree that the 
Estate has a 50% interest in the 
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aggregate General Partner Distribution 
Interests in each of the Retained Limited 
Partnerships.... 
Agreement, R. 100, Add. 1 (emphasis added). 
In paragraph 8 of the Agreement, the Estate released 
Heinz, Southwest Virginia and others from any and all claims, 
liabilities, causes of action, and demands of every kind 
arising from facts occurring prior to the date of the 
Agreement. Again, however, the Estate specifically reserved 
its rights to its distributive share from Southwest Virginia. 
Paragraph 8 of the Agreement provides in pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding anything here to the 
contrary, the provisions of this Section 
8 shall not apply to: 
(ii) obligations of the Retained Limited 
Partnerships under Section 2 herein 
relating to General Partner Distribution 
Interests of the Estate, or 
(iii) obligations of the Limited 
Partnerships with respect to the limited 
partner interests of the Estate referred 
to in Section 3 herein.... 
The clear, unambiguous language quoted above shows that 
the parties to the Agreement intended to, and went to great 
lengths to preserve the right of the Estate to its full 
distributive share from Southwest Virginia. Nevertheless, 
defendants assert that certain language in paragraph 5 of the 
Agreement which refers to the waiver by the Estate of its 
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rights to be subrogated to the interests of the Creditor 
Partnerships to recover payments made on behalf of the Debtor 
Partnerships on the Interpartnership Loans (i.e., step 3 of 
the diagram on page 11, supra) somehow waives the Estatefs 
right to a portion of its distributive share (step 4 of the 
diagram). It becomes clear that the interpretation proposed 
by defendants is incorrect when the entire paragraph 5 is 
considered, and when paragraph 5 is harmonized with the other 
provisions in the Agreement. Paragraph 5 provides: 
5. Interpartnership Loans. There have 
been loans made by and between some or 
all of the Limited Partnerships (the so-
called "Interpartnership Loans"), 
including, without limitation, loans made 
through the so-called CHA Trust or 
through CHA to the extent any part of the 
funds for such loans came from Limited 
Partnerships. The Estate and Heinz have 
advanced large sums of money which have 
been applied toward certain 
Interpartnership Loans. The amounts so 
advanced by the Estate total 
approximately $907,331.30. No such 
advances have been made by the Estate for 
more than four years and no demands have 
been made against the Estate during such 
four year period for additional advances. 
The Estate has not recovered any part of 
the amount so advanced but may be 
entitled to recover part of such amount 
on various theories, including, without 
limitation, the theory that the Estate is 
subrogated to the rights of those Limited 
Partnerships which received the benefit 
of such advances against those Limited 
Partnerships which have been net debtors 
with respect to Interpartnership Loans. 
The Estate hereby assigns, transfers and 
conveys to Heinz all of the Estate's 
rights, if any, to recover any part or 
all of the amounts advanced by it to be 
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applied toward Interpartnership Loans, 
and the Estate hereby releases any and 
all claims which it might otherwise have 
with respect to the future repayment, if 
any, of the Interpartnership Loans, In 
consideration therefor and in 
consideration of other benefits to Heinz 
under this Agreement, Heinz hereby agrees 
to indemnify and hold harmless the Estate 
from any and all claims, liabilities, 
causes of action, demands, damages, costs 
and expenses of any kind, whether known 
or unknown, fixed or contingent, which 
may be asserted against the Estate and 
which arise out of or are in any way 
connected with Interpartnership Loans, 
(emphasis added) 
It is clear that paragraph 5 is referring specifically to 
payments made by Heinz and the Estate on various 
Interpartnership Loans (i.e., step 2 on the diagram at page 
11, supra), and the right of those parties to be subrogated 
to the rights of the Creditor Partnerships to recover those 
obligations after they were advanced by Heinz or the Estate 
(i.e., step 3 on the diagram). There is no language 
whatsoever in paragraph 5 which can be construed to affect 
the distributive interests of the Estate (i.e., step 4 on the 
diagram). Indeed, the interpretation proposed by the 
defendants would directly contradict and render meaningless 
the provisions in Sections 2 and 8 of the Agreement in which 
the parties specifically reserve and provide for the payment 
to the Estate of a full 50% general partners distributive 
share from Southwest Virginia. In order to "harmonize" all 
provisions of the Agreement, paragraph 5 cannot be construed 
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to affect in any way the distributive share to which the 
Estate is entitled pursuant to the other specific terms of 
the Agreement. See L.D.S. Hospital v. Capital Life Insurance 
Co., 765 P.2d at 858. 
In addition to the specific language of the Agreement, 
additional compelling, undisputed evidence exists which 
supports the district court's determination. The Estate 
filed with the district court an Affidavit of Kenneth J. 
Hanni with various accounting sheets attached which were sent 
to him as co-counsel for the Estate on June 2, 1988 to 
support the distribution made to the Estate on March 22, 
1988. (Hanni Affidavit and Exhibit "B" thereto, R. 56, Add. 
2) The accounting was made and sent to Mr. Hanni by Michael 
Semken, the accountant for Southwest Virginia. Michael 
Semken was instructed by Heinz to make an accounting for 
purposes of making a distribution to the partners of 
Southwest Virginia. In the accounting the defendants 
revealed that it was their intention and understanding that 
funds which were derived from the repayment of the 
Interpartnership Loan were to be distributed to the Estate. 
The assets of Southwest Virginia which were subject to 
distribution to the partners were traceable to two sources. 
First, the sum of $1,429,000.00 constituted cash available 
from the sale of assets held by Southwest Virginia. Second, 
the sum of $194,220.98 was derived from the repayment of the 
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Interpartnership Loan. If the Estate was only entitled to a 
distribution to the extent it was derived from the sale of 
assets, the Estate would have been entitled to $111,346.40 
(one-half of the general partners1 40% interest in the 
$1,429,000.00 following the deduction of capital distribution 
to the limited partners in the sum of $872,268.00). However, 
under defendants1 accounting, Southwest Virginia 
constructively "collected" an additional $194,220.98 by 
offsetting the amount of the Interpartnership Loan obligation 
from the distributive share of the general partners and then 
distributed that amount to the partners, including the 
Estate. (Hanni Affidavit, Exhibit "B" thereto, R. 56, Add. 2) 
Thus, defendants1 own accounting shows that the parties 
intended and believed that the Estate was entitled to its 
full distributive share, from whatever source derived. It is 
apparent that the claim by defendants that paragraph 5 of the 
Agreement somehow affected the right of the Estate to collect 
its full distributive share was an after-thought, and was 
invented by the defendants in the context of this litigation. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that both the 
unambiguous and explicit language of the Agreement, as well 
as the defendants1 own accounting and conduct make it clear 
that the decision of the district court was correct. The 
Estate released only its subrogation rights to receive direct 
repayment of payments it had made on Interpartnership Loans, 
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while specifically reserving its right to a full distributive 
share from Southwest Virginia. The district court was 
correct in so ruling, and ordering the payment by defendants 
to the Estate of $97,110.49. 
III. Defendants Are Not Entitled To Reimbursement Of 
$4,257.04 Which Defendants Claim Was Overpaid As A 
Limited Partner Distribution To The Estate Because 
That Claim Was Not Raised In The Court Below And 
Because It Contradicts An Express Term Of The 
Agreement. 
Defendants attempt to raise for the first time on appeal 
a claim that the Estate was "overpaid" its limited partner 
distribution in the amount of $4,257.04 because that sum has 
as its source the repayment of the Interpartnership Loan to 
Southwest Virginia. Defendants did not raise this issue in 
their pleadings or argument before the district court. All 
argument raised and presented by defendants below concerned 
only the distributive share the Estate was entitled to 
receive as a general partner of Southwest Virginia. It is 
well settled that a party cannot raise on appeal issues not 
raised before the district court. See Cowen & Co. v. Atlas 
Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984); Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1140 (Utah 
1983); A & M Enterprises, Inc. v. Hunziker, 25 Utah 2d 363, 
482 P.2d 700 (1981). Consequently, having failed to raise 
the issue of any error in the distributive share received by 
the Estate as a limited partner of Southwest Virginia because 
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a portion of those funds were derived from the repayment of 
the Interpartnership Loan in the court below, defendants are 
precluded from raising that issue on appeal. 
In any event, the Agreement specifically and 
unequivocally provides that nothing in the Agreement will in 
any way affect the distributive share of the Estate as a 
limited partner of Southwest Virginia. Paragraph 3 of the 
Agreement states in pertinent part: 
Limited Partner Interests In Limited 
Partnerships. Nothing in this Agreement 
shall affect the Estate's right, title, 
and interest as a limited partner in the 
Limited Partnerships [including Southwest 
Virginia]. 
Under the terms of paragraph 3, there is no way that any 
release or other provision contained in the Agreement can be 
construed to affect the right of the Estate to receive its 
distributive share as limited partner of Southwest Virginia. 
Consequently, any claim by defendants concerning a reduction 
in the Estate's distributive share as a limited partner in 
Southwest Virginia based upon some release contained in the 
Agreement is completely without merit. 
IV. The District Court Properly Awarded The Estate Its 
Attorney Fees And Costs As Consequential Damages. 
The district court properly awarded the Estate its 
attorney fees and costs as consequential damages arising from 
the breach of the Agreement by defendants. In the recent 
case of Canyon Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P. 2d 414 (Utah 
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1989) , judgment was entered in the lower court for 
approximately $127,000.00, plus an additional sum of over 
$100,000.00 as reasonable attorney fees. On appeal, the 
defendant argued that there was no legal basis for the award 
of attorney fees because there was no statutory basis or 
contractual provision requiring the payment of attorney fees. 
The defendant also argued that the amount of fees was 
unreasonable. The Utah Supreme Court held as follows: 
In this case, there was no contractual 
provision requiring attorney fees, nor is 
Canyon Country entitled to recover fees 
by statute. Canyon Country's claim for 
recovery of fees was predicated on the 
theory that attorney fees were an item of 
consequential damages flowing from the 
insurers1 breach of contract. This is a 
legitimate theory of damages, as the 
district court recognized. However, 
attorney fees recovered as damages in a 
breach of contract suit must be based on 
the prevailing party's actual losses, 
i.e., its out-of-pocket expenses for 
legal counsel. The insurers may only be 
held liable to the extent Canyon Country 
was actually damaged, that is, in the 
same amount it was legally obligated to 
pay counsel. Thus, Canyon Country is 
entitled to recover in damages only that 
which it was obliged to pay: one-third of 
any recovery. Canyon Country 
successfully confused this issue at trial 
by arguing that a contingency agreement 
was not binding as a measure of damages 
and that "reasonableness" was the 
standard. "Reasonableness" is generally 
the standard when the basis of recovery 
is a statute or a contract. As pointed 
out earlier, however, Canyon Country's 
claim was based on neither. 
We hold, therefore, that Canyon Country 
was not entitled to "reasonable" fees, 
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but only to fees in the amount of one-
third of the amount ultimately recovered, 
as provided for in its attorney fees 
agreement. 
Id. at 42 0 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
The court in Canyon Country cited the case of Beck v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). In 
Beck, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
Damages recoverable for breach of 
contract include both general damages, 
i.e., those flowing naturally from the 
breach, and consequential damages, i.e., 
those reasonably within the contemplation 
of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the 
parties at the time the contract was 
made.... We have repeatedly recognized 
that consequential damages for breach of 
contract may reach beyond the bare 
contract terms. See e.g., Pacific Coast 
Title Insurance Company v. Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity, 7 Utah 2d. at 379, 
325 P. 2d at 908 (attorney fees incurred 
for settling and defending claims were 
foreseeable result of contractor's 
default).... 
Beck, supra, at 801-02. 
Certainly it was foreseeable and within the 
contemplation of the parties to the Agreement that a 
significant breach of that Agreement would likely result in 
legal action and the payment of substantial attorney fees by 
the non-breaching party, and attorney fees are thus 
recoverable as consequential damages. The nature of the 
Agreement and the terms and provisions thereof clearly 
indicate that it was within the contemplation of the parties, 
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or reasonably foreseeable at the time the Agreement was 
entered into, that if defendants breached the Agreement by 
asserting a released claim and/or offsetting it against the 
Estatefs distributive share, that the plaintiff would be 
forced to file an action and incur attorney fees. It was 
obvious that if defendants were to commit and persist in a 
major and clear breach of the Agreement plaintiff would have 
no alternative but to take legal action and thus attorney 
fees were a foreseeable consequence of such a breach. 
Consequently, under the case of Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracey, supra, and the other cases cited above dealing with 
consequential damages, the district court properly awarded 
the Estate its attorney fees as consequential damages for 
defendants1 breach of the Agreement• 
Defendants finally argue that the district court erred 
in awarding the Estate all of its attorney fees and costs 
incurred in pursing this action because the amount of those 
fees and costs was unreasonable. However, as the Utah 
Supreme Court noted in Canyon Country, fl f [reasonableness ! is 
generally the standard when the basis for recovery is a 
statute or a contract11. 781 P.2d at 420. When attorney fees 
are recovered as consequential damages, however, the award of 
fees "must be based on the prevailing party's actual losses, 
i.e., its out-of-pocket expenses for legal counsel." Id. at 
420. It is undisputed that the amount of attorney fees and 
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costs awarded to the Estate as consequential damages 
constitute the Estate's "out-of-pocket expenses for legal 
counsel". Consequently, the amount of attorney fees awarded 
by the district court was proper. 
In addition, the Estate presented evidence and argument 
to the district court establishing the reasonableness of the 
attorney fees. Counsel for the Estate presented two 
affidavits concerning attorney fees outlining in detail the 
work performed, the time spent and the hourly rate of the 
attorneys who pursued this action on behalf of the Estate. 
(Affidavits, R. 153, 284) In addition, the circumstances of 
this case indicate that the amount of fees awarded by the 
district court was reasonable. Prior to initiating this 
action, counsel for the Estate attempted on various occasions 
through telephone conferences and by letter to resolve this 
matter and convince defendants to acknowledge their breach of 
the Agreement, but all to no avail. Plaintiff has been forced 
to deal with three sets of legal counsel for the defendants 
regarding this dispute. After being forced to resort to 
initiation of this lawsuit, defendants filed an Answer raising 
spurious defenses through previous counsel, claiming, inter 
alia, that the Agreement did not reflect the intentions of the 
parties, mutual mistake, reformation and rescission, all of 
which had no basis in fact. After plaintiff prepared a 
detailed Motion For Summary Judgment and Memorandum, tracing 
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through the provisions and history of this complicated 
Agreement so that the court could determine the matter, and 
after preparing Grounds For Decision, a proposed Judgment and 
submitting the matter for decision, defendants after great 
delays filed a late memorandum through new counsel. 
Defendants then changed their position, and asserted by 
affidavit and through their Memorandum in Opposition 
additional claims and defenses. Thus, plaintiff was required 
to submit a Reply Memorandum and affidavits concerning totally 
new arguments asserted by defendants. Also, defendants cross-
moved for summary judgment based on the strained 
interpretation of the Agreement, ignoring the other portions 
of the Agreement which indicated the intent of the parties, 
and plaintiff was obliged to thoroughly respond to said 
motion. 
Under all of these circumstances, it was necessary for 
plaintiff's counsel to do a thorough job in making its 
presentations to the district court so that needless 
additional expense of pursing this case through trial could 
be avoided. Under such circumstances, the attorney fees 
awarded by the district court were reasonable. 
In addition, in spite of the evidence presented to the 
district court by the Estate by way of affidavits (R. 153, 
284) concerning the amount and reasonableness of the attorney 
fees requested, defendants presented no evidence whatsoever 
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which disputed the evidence presented by the Estate 
concerning the reasonableness of the fees. As the court noted 
in its Minute Entry,"No counter-affidavit has been filed on 
the issue of attorney's fees. The Affidavits submitted by 
plaintiff on the issue of fees and litigation expenses have 
not been challenged." (emphasis added). (Minute Entry, R. 
, Order re Attorney Feesf R. ) As this court 
recently held in Martindale v. Adams, 777 P. 2d 514, 517-18 
(Utah App. 1989): 
Where the evidence supporting the 
reasonableness of requested attorney fees 
is both adequate and entirely undisputed, 
as it was here, the court abuses its 
discretion in awarding less than the 
amount requested unless the reduction is 
warranted by one or more of the factors 
described in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 
764 P.2d 785, 787-91 (Utah 1988). 
See also Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah 
App. 1989) (reasonableness of attorney fee award affirmed 
where "the detailed fee affidavit submitted by defendants was 
not controverted or objected to".) 
In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, supra, the court 
outlines four questions which should be asked in determining 
whether an attorney fee award is reasonable: 
1. What legal work was actually 
performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was 
reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate 
consistent with the rates customarily 
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charged in the locality for similar 
services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require 
consideration of additional factors, 
including those listed in the Code of 
Professional Responsibility? 
764 P.2d at 990. 
These inquiries are answered in detail in the two 
affidavits on attorney fees submitted by counsel for the 
Estate. (R. 153, 284). Additional evidence and argument was 
also presented showing that these inquiries were met. As 
discussed above, much of the attorney fees incurred by the 
Estate in this matter were due to the unreasonable approach 
taken by defendants in refusing to acknowledge their breach 
of the Agreement short of litigation, the assertion of 
spurious defenses, the involvement of three separate law 
firms who appeared on behalf of defendants, and the 
completely different argument and approaches presented by the 
various attorneys representing the defendants in response to 
the Estate's Complaint and Motion For Summary Judgment. As 
noted by the court in Dixie State Bank: 
Calculation of reasonable attorney fees 
is in the sound discretion of the 
district court, and will not be 
overturned in the absence of a showing of 
a clear abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 988 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Based upon the foregoing, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that the amount of 
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attorney fees awarded to the Estate was reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Estate respectfully 
requests that this court affirm the judgment of the district 
court in awarding the Estate the sum of $97,110.49, plus 
interest, and in awarding the Estate attorney fees in the sum 
of $18,579.00 and costs in the amount of $92.50. 
Dated this day of July, 1990. 
EDWARDS, MCCOY & KENNEDY 
-T&Lt-f^ 
Randall S. F e l l 7 
Michael L. Ferrin 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this ^;cj^ day of July, 1990, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT to be served upon the following, by first-class 
mail, postage prepaid: 
James R. Brown, Esq. 
Harold L. Reiser, Esq. 
Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn 
370 East South Temple, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Agreement dated February 12, 1988 




THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this l'Z/3>^ dav of 
February, 1988, by and between Myrne M. Collier as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of James A. Collier (the "Estate"); 
Kerry M. Heinz ("Heinz"); Collier, Heinz and Associates, a Utah 
corporation ("CHA"); and the partnerships signing this Agreement 
on the signature page hereof (the "Partnerships"). 
In consideration of the mutual covenants herein to be kept 
and performed, and for other good and valuable consideration, 
receipt and sufficiency whereof are hereby acknowledged, the 
parties agree as follows: 
1. Facts and Objectives. Prior to his death on January 7, 
1980, James A. Collier ("Collier") and Heinz were associated 
together in many business enterprises. They were general 
partners and limited partners in various general partnerships and 
limited partnerships. They were shareholders, officers, and 
directors of CHA. They also had joint liability on various 
loans, contracts and other obligations. 
The probate proceeding for the Estate was commenced in the 
Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State of 
Utah, Probate No* 2890, and Myrne M. Collier was appointed as 
Personal Representative on about February 7, 1980. 
Heinz, CHA, many partnerships in which Heinz and Collier had 
been partners, and J. Sherman Peterson filed certain claims 
against the Estate in said probate proceeding relating to matters 
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in which both Collier and Heinz were involved. Some of those 
claims have been dismissed. Many have not been dismissed, and 
those not dismissed are identified in the Petitions for Allowance 
of Claims dated September 15, 1980, as claim nos. 18, 20, 21, 23, 
24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 38, 39, 41, 43, 44," 45, 46, 50, 
51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, 
73, 74, 75, 76, 78 and 79 (the "Remaining Probate Claims"). 
The Estate has also asserted claims against Heinz, CHA and 
various general partnerships and limited partnerships in which 
Collier and Heinz were general partners. 
The purpose of this Agreement is to memorialize the terms 
and conditions on which Heinz, CHA, and the Partnerships have 
agreed to release or obtain a release of the Remaining Probate 
Claims and on which the Estate has agreed to release certain 
claims which it has or may have against Heinz, CHA, and the 
Partnerships, and to memorialize other agreements between the 
parties, all as set forth herein. 
2. General Partner Interests in Limited Partnerships. 
Those limited partnerships in which Collier and Heinz were the 
only general partners prior to Colliers death are hereinafter 
referred to as the "Limited Partnerships." The Estate has never 
been a general partner of any of the Limited Partnerships, but it 
has or may have a right to participate in distributions allocable 
to the general partners (herein referred to as "General Partner 
Distribution Interests"). The Estate hereby relinquishes any and 
all General Partner Distribution Interests which it has or may 
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have in any or all of the Limited Partnerships except those 
described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto (the "Retained Limited 
Partnerships"). With respect to the Retained Limited 
Partnerships, the Estate, Heinz, and each of the Retained Limited 
Partnerships agree that the Estate has a fifty percent interest 
in the aggregate General Partner Distribution Interests in each 
of the Retained Limited Partnerships, except Hickory Shopping 
Center- Associates, and with respect to Hickory Shopping Center 
Associates, the Estate has a twenty-five percent interest in the 
aggregate General Partner Distribution Interests therein. 
Promptly after the execution of this Agreement, the Estate, 
Heinz, and the Related Limited Partnerships agree to execute or 
cause to be executed amendments to the partnership agreements 
pertaining to the Limited Partnerships to reflect the provisions 
of this Section 2. 
3. Limited Partner Interests in Limited Partnerships. 
Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the Estate1s right, title, 
and interest as a limited partner in the Limited Partnerships. 
The Estate, Heinz, and each of the Limited Partnerships agree 
that the limited partner interests of the Estate are correctly 
set forth on Exhibit "B" which is attached hereto. During the 
course of the administration of the Estate, the Estate and Heinz 
acknowledge that each of them acquired fifty percent of the 
limited partner interest previously owned by Charles Umansky in 
Sierra Vista Shopping Center Associates, a Utah limited 
partnership, and such acquisition of ownership by the Estate and 
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Heinz is reflected on Exhibit ,fB.M The Estate, Heinz, and the 
Limited Partnerships shall, at the request of the Estate, execute 
or cause to be executed such amendments to the partnership 
agreements pertaining to the Limited Partnerships as are 
necessary to reflect correctly the limited partner interests set 
forth on Exhibit ,fB" and to cause the assignees of the Estate in 
connection with the distribution of the Estate's assets to be 
substituted as limited partners of the Limited Partnerships. 
4. Note Obligation of Roanoke-Whitesides. As of September 
13, 1983, the Estate advanced $12,000 to Roanoke-Whitesides 
Shopping Center Associates ("Roanoke-Whitesides") which was used 
by said partnership to pay amounts owed by it on loans for money 
borrowed from one or more individuals. As a result of such 
advance the Estate, Heinz, and Roanoke-Whitesides agree that 
Roanoke-Whitesides is obligated to pay to the Estate the 
principal amount of $12,000, together with simple interest at the 
rate of ten percent per annum from September 13, 1983; provided, 
however, the amount owed shall be paid only out of Roanoke-
Whitesides1 property, and, except as may otherwise be provided 
with respect to partners generally under Utah partnership law, 
Heinz, CHA, and their respective heirs, personal representatives, 
successors and assigns, shall have no personal liability, either 
individually or as a general partner in Roanoke-Whitesides, for 
the repayment to the Estate of the amount owed. Concurrent with 
the execution of this Agreement, Roanoke-Whitesides has executed 
and delivered to the Estate a promissory note in favor of the 
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Estate in the form attached hereto as Exhibit MC,M setting forth 
the terms of its debt obligation to the Estate. 
5. Interpartnership Loans. There have been loans made by 
and between some or all of the Limited Partnerships (the so-
called wInterpartnership Loans"), including, without-limitation, 
loans made through the so-called CHA Trust or through CHA to the 
extent any part of the funds for such loans came from Limited 
Partnerships. The Estate and Heinz have advanced large sums of 
money which have been applied toward certain Interpartnership 
Loans. The amounts so advanced by the Estate total approximately 
$907,331.30. No such advances have been made by the Estate for 
more than four years and no demands have been made against the 
Estate during such four year period for additional advances. The 
Estate has not recovered any part of the amount so advanced but 
may be entitled to recover part of such amount on various 
theories, including, without limitation, the theory that the 
Estate is subrogated to the rights of those Limited Partnerships 
which received the benefit of such advances against those Limited 
Partnerships which have been net debtors with respect to 
Interpartnership Loans. The Estate hereby assigns, transfers and 
conveys to Heinz all of the Estate1 s rights, if any, to recover 
any part or all of the amounts advanced by it to be applied 
toward Interpartnership Loans, and the Estate hereby releases any 
and all claims which it might otherwise have with respect to the 
future repayment, if any, of the Interpartnership Loans. In 
consideration therefor and in consideration of other benefits to 
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Heinz under this Agreement, Heinz hereby agrees to indemnify and 
hold harmless the Estate from any and all claims, liabilities, 
causes of action, demands, damages, costs and expenses of any 
kind, whether known or unknown, fixed or contingent, which may be 
asserted against the Estate and which arise out of or are in any 
way connected with Interpartnership Loans, 
6. Quitclaim Deed to Park City Condominium. Concurrent 
with the execution of this Agreement, the Estate has executed a 
quitclaim deed to the Park City condominium to which CHA held 
record title at the time of Collier's death. Such deed is in the 
form attached hereto as Exhibit nD." 
7. Indemnification by Heinz» Heinz hereby agrees to 
indemnify and hold harmless the Estate from any and all claims, 
liabilities, causes of action, demands, damages, costs and 
expenses of every kind, whether known or unknown, fixed or 
contingent, which may be asserted against the Estate and which 
arise out of or are in any way connected with: (a) any of the 
Limited Partnerships, including, without limitation, the status, 
acts, or omissions to act of James A. Collier and/or Heinz as 
general partners or limited partners of any of the Limited 
Partnerships and any acts or omissions to act by the Estate, its 
agents and representatives (including personal and legal 
representatives) with respect to any of the Limited Partnerships, (b) 
CHA, including, without limitation, the status, acts, or 
omissions to act of James A. Collier and/or Heinz as directors, 
officers, and employees of CHA and any acts or omissions to act 
-6- 02/12/88 
by the Estate, its agents and representatives (including 
personal and legal representatives) with respect to CHA, (c) the 
Interpartnership Loans and the loans referred to in the Remaining 
Probate Claims, and (d) any other facts or circumstances referred 
to in any probate claims, including, without limitation, the 
Remaining Probate Claims, which were made against the Estate and 
which were signed by Heinz in an individual and/or representative 
capacity. 
8. Release bv the Estate, The Estate hereby releases, 
acquits and forever discharges Heinz, the Partnerships, CHA, and 
their respective agents, heirs, personal and legal 
representatives, successors and assigns, and each of them, from 
any and all claims, liabilities, causes of action, and demands of 
every kind, whether known or unknown, fixed or contingent, 
arising out of, incident to, based upon, or in any way connected 
with any facts occurring prior to the date hereof or which may 
have occurred prior to the date hereof, including without 
limitation: 
(a) any claim under that certain agreement dated 
October 31, 1979, between Collier and Heinz pursuant to 
which Collier sold and Heinz purchased certain shares of 
stock in CHA, 
(b) any claim under that certain agreement dated 
October 31, 1979, between Collier and Heinz pursuant to 
which Collier sold and Heinz purchased certain partnership 
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interests in partnerships of which Financial Management 
Services was the general partner, 
(c) any claim relating to proceeds from insurance 
policies on the life of Collier which were paid to Zions 
First National Bank and used by said bank to satisfy certain 
obligations of Heinz, CHA, and certain of the Limited 
Partnerships, 
(d) any claim relating to insurance commissions which 
were paid to Zions First National Bank and used by said bank 
to satisfy certain obligations of Heinz, CHA, and certain of 
the Limited Partnerships, 
(e) any claim to the name Collier, Heinz and 
Associates, and 
(f) any claim to the bronzes and wood carvings which 
prior to the death of Collier were located in the offices of 
CHA. 
Notwithstanding anything here to the contrary, the 
provisions of this Section 8 shall not apply to: 
(i) obligations of Roanoke-Whitesides under the 
promissory note to be executed pursuant to Section 4 
herein (provided that Heinz1 and CHA's liability with 
respect thereto is limited as described in Section 4 
herein), or 
(ii) obligations of the Retained Limited 
Partnerships under Section 2 herein relating to General 
Partner Distribution Interests of the Estate, or 
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(iii) obligations of the Limited Partnerships 
with respect to the limited partner interests of the 
Estate referred to in Section 3 herein, or 
(iv) obligations of Heinz under Section 7 herein 
relating to indemnification, or 
(v) obligations of Heinz under Section 9 herein, 
or 
(vi) obligations of the parties under Sections 2 
and 3 herein relating to the execution of amendments to 
partnership -agreements and under Section 14 herein 
relating to supplemental documentation. 
The Estate represents and warrants to Heinz that it has not 
at any time assigned or transferred any claims against Heinz or 
other rights of the type described in this Section. 
9. Heinz Individual Payment. As part of the 
consideration for the release set forth in Section 8 herein, 
Heinz individually agrees to pay to the Estate at the Closing, 
as defined in Section 15 herein, without offset or deduction, the 
principal amount of $150,000, plus interest thereon at the rate 
of ten percent per annum for each day that the Closing is delayed 
beyond February 29, 1988. 
10. Release by Heinz, CHA and the Partnerships. Heinz, CHA 
and the Partnerships, and each of them, hereby release, acquit 
and forever discharge the Estate, its agents, personal and legal 
representatives and their successors and assigns, and each of 
them, from any and all claims, liabilities, causes of action, and 
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demands of every kind, whether known or unknown, fixed or 
contingent, arising out of, incident to, based upon, or in any 
way connected with any facts occurring prior to the date hereof 
or which may have occurred prior to the date hereof. 
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the provisions 
of this Section 10 shall not apply to any obligations of the 
Estate under Section 14 herein relating to supplemental 
documentation. Heinz, CHA and the Partnerships, and each- of 
them, represent and warrant to the Estate that they have not at 
any time assigned or transferred any claims against the Estate or 
other rights of the type described in this Section. 
11. Payments to Partnerships. At the Closing, the Estate 
shall deliver to each of the Partnerships, without offset or 
deduction, the amount of $50. 
12. Release of Remaining Probate Claims. Concurrent with 
the execution of this Agreement, Heinz (individually and as a 
general partner for and on behalf of the Limited Partnerships), 
CHA, and the other claimants under the Remaining Probate Claims 
have executed and delivered to the Estate a motion and 
stipulation for dismissal thereof in the form attached hereto as 
Exhibit WE,M and have approved an order of dismissal in the form 
attached hereto as Exhibit nF." Heinz agrees to take such other 
steps as may be necessary to effect the dismissal thereof with 
prejudice. 
13. Dismissal of Litigation. Concurrent with the execution 
of this Agreement, the Estate has executed a motion and 
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stipulation for dismissal with prejudice and has approved an 
order of dismissal, in the forms of Exhibits ffG" and MH" attached 
hereto, respectively, for the dismissal of the case of Mvme Moss 
Collier, personal representative of the James A, Collier Estate 
vs. Kerry M. Heinz. Civil No* C85-7349, in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Estate 
agrees to take such other steps as may be necessary to effect the 
dismissal thereof with prejudice. 
14. Supplemental Documentation. The Estate, Heinz, CHA, 
and the Partnerships each agree to execute such additional 
documents and instruments as may be requested by any other party 
hereto to give effect to the intention of the parties in this 
Agreement. 
15. Closing. The Closing (the ••Closing") shall be held on 
a regular business day between March 1, 1988 and March 15, 1988, 
both dates inclusive, at the offices of Edwards & McCoy, Suite 
400, 57 West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, at 10:00 a.m. 
on a specific date to be selected by Heinz and communicated to 
the Estate at least three days in advance. If no date prior to 
March 15, 1988, is selected, then the Closing shall be held 
without notice at 10:00 a.m. on March 15, 1988. 
At the Closing, Heinz shall deliver to the Estate cash or 
its equivalent in the amount of $150,000 plus interest thereon at 
the rate of ten percent per annum commencing March 1, 1988, as 
contemplated in Section 9 herein. At the Closing, the Estate 
shall deliver to Heinz the quitclaim deed identified in Section 6 
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herein and the motion and stipulation and order of dismissal 
identified in Section 13 herein and shall also deliver cash or 
its equivalent in the amount of $50 for each of the Limited 
Partnerships as contemplated in Section 11 herein. 
16. Estate Remedies, In the event of failure of Heinz to 
pay to the Estate at the Closing the principal amount of $150,000 
plus interest as herein provided, and provided the Estate has 
tendered delivery to Heinz of the documents and money to be 
delivered by it at the Closing as set forth in Section 15 herein, 
the Estate shall have the following alternative remedies: 
(a) Subject to return by the Estate to Heinz on or 
before March 31, 1988, of the promissory note executed by 
Roanoke-Whitesides which is identified in Section 4 herein 
and the motion and stipulation for dismissal and the order 
of dismissal which are identified in Section 12 herein, the 
Estate may rescind and declare this Agreement to be null and 
void except for Section 2 (General Partner Interests in 
Limited Partnerships) and Section 3 (Limited Partner 
Interests in Limited Partnerships)• Sections 2 and 3 herein 
shall remain in full force and effect even in the event of 
the Estate1 s election of the remedy set forth in this part 
(a). 
(b) Subject to delivery by the Estate to Heinz and the 
Limited Partnerships on or before March 31, 1988, of the 
documents and money to be delivered by it to Heinz at the 
Closing, the Estate may treat this Agreement as being in 
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full force and effect and proceed to exercise all rights and 
remedies available to the Estate at law or in equity to 
collect the principal amount of $150,000, plus accrued 
interest, which Heinz failed to pay at the Closing. After 
March 15, 1988, such principal amount of $150,000 shall bear 
interest at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum 
until paid. Heinz agrees to pay all collection costs 
incurred by the Estate, including, without limitation, 
reasonable attorneys1 fees. 
Delivery by the Estate to Heinz and the Partnerships of documents 
or money in accordance with Section 15 and this Section 16 may be 
made by delivery thereof to the offices of Hansen & Anderson, 6th 
Floor, Valley Tower Building, 50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101, Attention: Cary D. Jones. 
17. Heinz Remedies. In the event of failure of the Estate 
to deliver the documents and money to be delivered by the Estate 
to Heinz and the Partnerships at the Closing as provided in 
Section 15 herein, and provided that Heinz has tendered delivery 
to the Estate of the money to be delivered by him at the Closing 
as set forth in Section 15 herein, Heinz shall have the following 
alternatives: 
(a) Heinz may rescind and declare this Agreement to be 
null and void. 
(b) Subject to tender by Heinz on or before March 31, 
1988, of the money to be delivered by him to the Estate at 
the Closing as set forth in Section 15 herein, Heinz may 
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treat this Agreement as being in full force and effect and 
proceed to exercise all rights and remedies available to 
Heinz at law or in equity, including, without limitation, 
suing for specific performance. The Estate agrees to pay 
all costs incurred by Heinz in such proceeding, including, 
without limitation, reasonable attorneys1 fees. For this 
part (b) only, tender of money by Heinz may be made by 
placing the money in the trust account of Hansen & Anderson 
for the benefit of the Estate, subject to the Estate fs 
performance. 
Delivery by Heinz to the Estate of money in accordance with 
Section 15 and this Section 17 may be made by delivery thereof to 
the offices of Edwards & McCoy, Suite 400, 57 West 200 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, Attention: Robert W. Edwards. 
18. Authorization. Each individual executing this 
Agreement in a representative capacity represents and warrants 
that he or she is duly authorized and empowered to do so and that 
this Agreement and each note, release, or other instrument to be 
executed pursuant to this Agreement is and shall be in all 
respects valid and binding upon the parties for which such 
individual is executing this Agreement as acts and obligations of 
such parties. 
19. Confidentiality. Each party to this Agreement agrees 
to maintain the confidentiality of the amounts paid pursuant to 
Sections 9 and 11 herein except as disclosure thereof is made in 
any judicial proceeding or is required by law; provided, 
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however, the maximum liability of any party for any breach of 
this confidentiality obligation shall be $5,000. 
20. Miscellaneous. 
(a) The parties acknowledge, declare and agree that 
the terms of this Agreement have been read by them and are 
fully understood and voluntarily accepted for the purpose of 
making a full, final and complete compromise, adjustment and 
settlement of any and all transactions, agreements, courses 
of dealings which may have arisen or may arise, all under 
the terms and conditions expressly contained herein, and 
that this Agreement is entered into for the sake of buying 
peace and avoiding protracted and lengthy further efforts to 
resolve disputes among the parties. 
(b) This Agreement contains the settlement of certain 
doubtful and disputed claims, and the consideration herein 
is not to be construed as an admission of liability on the 
part of any party, by whom liability is expressly denied. 
(c) This Agreement contains the entire understanding 
between the parties hereto, and the terms of this Agreement 
are contractual and not a mere recital. Exhibits to this 
Agreement are incorporated herein by this reference. 
Section headings are for convenience only and shall not 
affect the interpretation of this Agreement. 
(d) This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to 
the benefit of the parties, their successors and assigns, 
heirs, and personal representatives. 
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(e) This Agreement shall be interpreted, applied and 
enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement has been executed. 
^ y*. rt/U„i 
Myrne M. Collier, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
James A, Collier 
Kerry M^ Heinz ' 7 \ 
Collier, Heinz and Associates 
BY L(MU /M. ilW^ 
Kerry M*^  Heinz, presfidtent 
Academy Square Associates 
^''ku&jj, ftp. i>Art&> 
Kerry M/7Heinz, General Partner 
Academy Square Land Associates 
By ^ M ^ I . / W . . . 
Kerry W. Heinz, Ge£ve»al Partner 
Alta Vista Shopping Center Associates 
Kerry Mw^Heinz, General Partner 
Buena Park Shopping Center Associates 
By "t<UtXU. fi/1. ^ Uou£^ 
Kerry M. Heinz, General Partner 
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CHA Bui lding A s s o c i a t e s 
BV 'ty/i/>/j fr/\- ^MP 
Kerry M^-Heinz, Gene^ ra)l Partner 
CHA Trust 
,s ./ . 
By ^/xAAJts //7 . A?OJs°" 
Kerry 14< Heinz, General Partner 
or Trustee. If CHA Trust is not 
a partnership, it is still to be 
deemed one of the Partnerships 
for purposes of the Agreement, 
Decatur Shopping Center Associates 
By &IM jt\. di-.-?£-
Kerry M/ Heinz, General partner 
Encinitas Shopping Center Associates 
BY T^MJ/ M- M&/Jp> 
Kerry^Hj Heinz, gerfceral P a r t n e r 
Foothills of Albuquerque Shopping 
Center Associates 
By. ^ ^ , 1 ; / / / / ^ , >U.uof^ 
Kerry^ M/ Heinz, Gen^rAl P a r t n e r 
Franklin Plaza Shopping Center 
Associates 
By r^UUuU (ty //urt& 
Kerry M..Heinz, Gex{er£l P a r t n e r 
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Fresno Townehouse Associates 
•I / ; • 
Kerry1 Yiy Heinz, General Partner 
Gateway West Shopping Center Associates 
By J^AAM (K\> r 
Kerry M./Ifeinz, Generalx Partner 
Hickory Shopping Center Assoc ia tes 
BY 'TUAAfJi fo\. lU.hsS> 
Kerry M./Heinz, General Partner 
Kingfs Shopping Center Associates 
By. JLAAJJ, /m /UWA£* 
Kerfy lid Heinz, Ge^ fe^ al Partner 
La Palma Avenue Shopping Center 
Associates 
By_A 
ry M^Heinz, Gei^ er^ l Kerr Partner 
Latrobe Shopping Center Associates 
By. 
Kerry M./^einz, General Partner 
Lino, Ltd. 
Bv -K(MM M. , ^ W ^ 
Kerry M/Heinz , Ge-nefral H/Heinz, gnejral Partner 
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Loretto Shopping Center Associates 
Bv f^AAh/J An. 6J.I,AT> 
Kerry1 M^Heinz, General Partner 
Oak Grove Shopping Center Assoc iates 
BV C&ASJJ M- MtwS* 
Kerryl^jHeinz, General Partner 
Palmer Plaza Shopping Center Associates 
By. *'/AAW M ^CAA^ 
Kerry y,< Heinz, Gene^l Partner 
Pinal County Shopping Center Associates 
BV PAAJ'W, M- nj-
Kerry Myfteinz, Gene^fl Partner 
Pinebrook Shopping Center Associates 
Bv 'PJMAJ ftA . / / M > 
Kerr^ My/lteinz, Gen^r^L Partner 
Pulaski Shopping Center Associates 
Bv „ _ 
Kerr^ M/" Heinz, General Partner 
Riverside Shopping Center Associates 
BV T\t/*jj AA i A*4^ 
Kerry VLS Heinz, Gftiejral Partner 
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Riverview Shopping Center Associates 
/ 
By. "iLtMA (PA I(LUA/^> 
Kerr^ MS Heinz, General Partner 
Roanoke-Hollins Shopping Center 
Associates 
By -/Wji 6A A ^y^,..___ _ 
Kerry VLf Heinz , General Partner J 
Roanoke-Whitesides Shopping Center 
Associates 
By '/uAhHr <kl< /^*qf* 
Kerry M<1 Heinz, General Partner 
Rocky Mount Shopping Center Associates 
By ^ /UMM, /M . HWutf^ 
Kerry M/jHeinz, Gener^rJ>artner 
SCM&M Shopping Center Associates 
By L^tMJJ (PA > frW^^ 
Kerry Mil Heinz, Ge^r^al Partner 
Sierra Vista Shopping Center Associates 




By TSXCWJ fr)« 
Kerry M.J Heinz, GeQerl^ l 
Partner 
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Kerry fiK\Heinz, Ge^e^al Partner 
Southwest Virginia Shopping Center 
Associates 
By 'I^UAXL M . JMun^ 
Kerr^ M•/Heinz, General Partner 
Village Square Shopping Center 
Associates 
BV c£youJr fiA IH^MJ^ 
Kerr^ M/^Heinz, G^ rte):al Partner 
WDR^Roanoke Shopping Center Associates 
By r/VM4 /M _ _ 
Kerry K/1 Heinz, Gen€ril Partner 
JuAJdJ /M /cUabP-
Kerry M/j Heinz as gehejral partner 
for ancLon behalf of"each limited 
partnership not otherwise executing 
this Agreement of which, immediately 
prior to the death of James A. 
Collier, Kerry M. Heinz and James A. 




Exhibit A List of Retained Limited Partnerships 
Exhibit B Limited Partner Interests of the Estatje 
Exhibit C Form of Promissory Note by Roanoke-Whitesides 
Exhibit D Quitclaim Deed to Park City condominium 
Exhibit E Stipulation and Motion for Dismissal of the Remaining 
Probate Claims 
Exhibit F Order of Dismissal with Prejudice of Certain Claims 
Exhibit G Stipulation and Motion for Dismissal of Mvrne Moss 
Collier, personal representative of the James A, 
Collier Estate vs. Kerry M. Heinz 
Exhibit H Order of Dismissal with Prejudice of Mvrne Moss 
Collier, personal representative of the James A, 
Collier Estate vs. Kerry H. Heinz 
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EXHIBIT A 
LIST OF RETAINED LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 
Alta Vista Shopping Center Associates 
Hickory Shopping Center Associates 
La Palma Avenue Shopping Center Associates 
Sierra Vista Shopping Center Associates 
South Main Street Shopping Center Associates 
Southwest Virginia Shopping Center Associates 
EXHIBIT B 
LIMITED PARTNER INTERESTS OF THE ESTATE 
Limited Partner 
Interests 
Name of Limited Partnership- of the Estate 
Alta Vista Shopping Center Associates 1.00% 
Southwest Virginia Shopping Center Associates 3.66% 
Foothills of Albuquerque Shopping Center Associates 2.89% 
Franklin Plaza Shopping Center Associates 1.00% 
Gateway West Shopping Center Associates 2.18% 
La Palma Avenue Shopping Center Associates 40.20% 
South Main Street Shopping Center Associates 1.39% 
King's Shopping Center Associates .22% 
Hickory Shopping Center Associates 1.72% 
Pinebrook Shopping Center Associates .54% 
Riverview Shopping Center Associates 1.00% 
Sierra Vista Shopping Center Associates 8.00% 
Roanoke - Whitesides Shopping Center Associates 1.00% 
The Limited Partner Interests shown above are stated as per-





$12#000 , 1988 
Plus Accrued Interest Salt Lake City, Utah 
from September 13, 1983 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned limited partnership 
promises and agrees to pay to the order of Myrne M. Collier, as 
personal representative of the Estate of James A. Collier, 
deceased (the "Estate") at Suite 400, 57 West 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101, or at such other place as the holder(s) hereof 
may designate in writing, the principal sum of Twelve Thousand 
Dollars ($12,000), in lawful money of the United States of 
America, together with simple interest at the rate of ten percent 
(10%) per annum from September 13, 1983 until due* Principal and 
interest shall be due and payable in full prior to any 
distributions being made by the undersigned to any of its general 
partners or limited partners, their successors or assigns with 
respect to their partnership interests in the undersigned. The 
obligation evidenced by this Note is owed to the Estate as a 
general creditor of the undersigned limited partnership. 
Prepayment of principal and accrued interest may be made 
hereunder at any time without penalty 
In the event any amount provided to be paid hereunder is not 
paid in full when due, the entirety of such payment shall, for the 
period during which it remains unpaid and both before and after 
judgment, bear interest at a rate of eighteen percent (18%) per 
annum. 
In the event: (a) a petition is filed seeking that the 
undersigned be adjudged a bankrupt; or (b) the undersigned makes a 
general assignment for the benefit of creditors; or (c) the 
undersigned suffers the appointment of a receiver; or (d) the 
undersigned becomes insolvent; or (e) the undersigned undergoes 
liquidation, termination, or dissolution, then, in any such event, 
the entire remaining unpaid balance of both principal and accrued 
interest owing hereunder shall, at the option of the holder hereof 
and without notice or demand, become immediately due and payable. 
The acceptance of any payment after the occurrence of a default or 
event giving rise to the right of acceleration provided for in 
this paragraph shall not constitute a waiver of such right of 
acceleration with respect to such default or event or any 
subsequent default or event. 
In the event any payment under this Note is not made, at the 
time and in the manner required, the undersigned agrees to pay any 
and all costs and expenses which may be incurred by the holder 
hereof in connection with the enforcement of any of its rights 
under this Note, including costs and reasonable attorney's fees, 
whether incurred with or without suit or before or after judgment. 
Notwithstanding any other provision contained in this Note: 
(i) the rates of interest, charges, and penalties provided for 
herein shall in no event exceed the maximum allowed by law; and 
(ii) if, for any reason whatsoever, the holder hereof ever 
receives as interest in connection with the transaction of which 
this Note is a part an amount exceeding the maximum allowed by 
law, such amount or portion thereof as would otherwise be 
excessive interest shall automatically be applied toward reduction 
of the unpaid principal balance then outstanding hereunder and not 
toward payment of interest. 
The maker(s) hereof severally waive presentment for payment, 
protest, demand, notice of protest, notice of dishonor, and notice 
of nonpayment, and expressly agree that this Note, or any payment 
hereunder, may be extended from time to time by the holder hereof 
without in any way affecting the liability of such parties. This 
Note shall be the joint and several obligation of all makers, 
sureties, guarantors, and endorsers, and shall be binding upon 
their respective heirs, personal representatives, successors, and 
assigns. The person executing this instrument on behalf of the 
undersigned limited partnership individually and personally 
binding upon said limited partnership as an act and obligation of 
said limited partnership. 
Notwithstanding any provision herein to the contrary, the 
amounts owed under this Note shall be paid only out of the 
property of the undersigned limited partnership; and, except to 
the extent of his interest in the undersigned limited partnership, 
Kerry M. Heinz, and his heirs, personal representatives, 
successors and assigns, shall have no personal liability, either 
individually or as general partner of the undersigned limited 
partnership, for the payment of this Note. 
Roanoke-Whitesides Shopping 
Center Associates, a Utah 
limited partnership 
By 
Kerry M. Heinz, General Partner 
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-THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE.' 
Recorded at Request of 
it M. Fee Paid $_ 
by Dep. Book Page Ref.:. 
Mail tax notice to Address 
($uit-<Elaitn ieeb 
MYRNE M. COLLIER/ AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES A. 
COLLIER/ d e c e a s e d / .grantor, 
of B o u n t i f u l .County of D a v i s .State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM to 
KERRY M. HEINZ .grantee, 
of 
for the sum of 
TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration XBSi&XKX, 
the following described tract of land in Sunmit County, 
State of Utah: 
Unit No. 106, PARK AVENUE CONDOMINIUMS, a Utah Condominium project, 
together with an undivided eight hundred thirty three thousandths 
percent (.833%) ownership Interest 1n the Common Areas of said 
Park Avenue Condominiums, which interest is appurtenant to said unit, 
as the same are extablished and identified in the Survey Map filed 
for record as Entry No. 119740. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor .this day of 
February .A.D., one thousand nine hundred and e i g h t y - e i g h t . 
Signed in the presence of 
WhfflHB'rfMPgHbgg 
COLLIER, DECEASED 
STATE OF UTAH I 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE J 
On the day of February ,19 88 •personally appeared before me 
MYRNE M. COLLIER, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF 
JAMES A. COLLIER, DECEASED , the signer of the within instrument, who 
duly acknowledged to me that s he executed the same. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing at: 
APPROVED FORM - UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION 
•i_»w *—»w e t r* • »».. 
Exhibit E 
Robert W. Edwards (A0961) 
EDWARDS & MCCOY 
Attorneys for Estate of 
James A. Collier 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6500 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the natter of the 
Estate of JAMES A. 
COLLIER, 
Deceased. 
STIPULATION AND MOTION 
FOR DISMISSAL 
Probate No. 2890 
COME NOW the following petitioners: 
(a) Kerry M. Heinz and J. Sherman Peterson with 
respect to Claim No. 18, 
(b) J. Sherman Peterson with respect to Claim No. 
20, 
(c) Collier, Heinz and Associates, Kerry M. Heinz 
and J. Sherman Peterson with respect to Claim No. 21, 
(d) Kerry M. Heinz and Gateway West (also known as 
Gateway West Shopping Center Associates), a limited 
partnership, with respect to Claim No. 23, 
(e) Kerry M. Heinz and Hickory (also known as 
Hickory Shopping Center Associates), a limited partnership, 
with respect to Claim No. 24,. 
(f) Kerry M. Heinz and Kings (also known as Kings 
Shopping Center Associates), a limited partnership, with 
respect to Claim No. 26, 
(g) Kerry M. Heinz and Palmer Plaza (also known as 
Palmer Plaza Shopping Center Associates), a limited 
partnership, with respect to Claim No. 28, 
(h) Kerry M. Heinz and Roanoke-Whitesides (also 
known as Roanoke-Whitesides Shopping Center Associates), a 
limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 29, 
(i) Kerry M. Heinz and Decatur (also known as 
Decatur Shopping Center Associates), a limited partnership, 
with respect to Claim No. 30, 
(j) Kerry M. Heinz and WDR - Roanoke (also known 
as WDR - Roanoke Shopping Center Associates), a limited 
partnership, with respect to Claim No. 31, 
(k) Collier, Heinz and Associates and Kerry M. 
Heinz with respect to Claim No. 32, 
(1) Collier, Heinz and Associates and Kerry M. 
Heinz with respect to Claim No. 34, 
(m) Collier, Heinz and Associates and Kerry M. 
Heinz with respect to Claim No. 38, 
(n) Kerry M. Heinz with respect to Claim No. 39, 
(o) Kerry M. Heinz with respect to Claim No. 41, 
(p) Kerry M. Heinz and La Palma Shopping Center 
Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 
43, 
(q) Kerry M. Heinz with respect to Claim No. 44, 
(r) Kerry M. Heinz and Academy Square Land 
Association, a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 
45, 
(s) Kerry M. Heinz and Academy Square Association, 
a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 46, 
(t) Kerry M. Heinz and CHA Trust, a limited 
partnership, with respect to Claim No. 50, 
(u) Kerry M. Heinz and Decatur Shopping Center 
Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 
51, 
(v) Kerry M. Heinz and Encinitas Shopping Center 
Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 
52, 
(w) Kerry M. Heinz and Foothills Shopping Center 
Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 
53, 
(x) Kerry M. Heinz and Franklin Shopping Center 
Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 
54, 
(y) Kerry M. Heinz and Gateway West Shopping 
Center Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to 
Claim No. 56, 
(z) Kerry M. Heinz and Hickory Shopping Center 
Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 
57, 
(aa) Kerry M. Heinz and King Shopping Center 
Associates (also known as Kings Shopping Center Associates), 
a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No, 58, 
(bb) Kerry M. Heinz and La Palma Shopping Center 
Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 
59, 
(cc) Kerry M. Heinz and Oak Grove Shopping Center 
Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 
63, 
(dd) Kerry M. Heinz and Palmer Shopping Center 
Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 
64, 
(ee) Kerry M. Heinz and Pinal County Shopping 
Center Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to 
Claim No. 65, 
(ff) Kerry M. Heinz and Pinebrook Shopping Center 
Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 
66, 
(gg) Kerry M. Heinz and Riverside Shopping Center 
Association (also known as Riverside Shopping Center 
Associates), a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 
68, 
(hh) Kerry M. Heinz and Riverview Shopping Center 
Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 
69, 
(ii) Kerry M. Heinz and S C M & M Shopping Center 
Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 
71, 
(jj) Kerry M. Heinz and Sierra Vista Shopping 
Center Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to 
Claim No. 72, 
(kk) Kerry M. Heinz and Sincerely Yours, a limited 
partnership, with respect to Claim No. 73, 
(11) Kerry M. Heinz and South Main Shopping Center 
Associates, with respect to Claim No. 74, 
(mm) Kerry M. Heinz and Southwest Virginia 
Shopping Center Associates, a limited partnership, with 
respect to Claim No. 75, 
(nn) Kerry M. Heinz and Village Square Shopping 
Center Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to 
Claim No. 76, 
(oo) Kerry M. Heinz and Whiteside Shopping Center 
Associates, a limited partnership, with respect to Claim No. 
78, 
(pp) Collier, Heinz and Associates and Kerry M. 
Heinz with respect to Claim No. 79, 
and Myrne M. Collier, the Personal Representative of the 
Estate of James A. Collier, deceased, and hereby stipulate 
and move that the various Petitions for Allowance of Claims, 
each dated September 15, 1980, as they relate to the claims 
referred to above, be dismissed with prejudice and without 
costs, the claims having been fully settled and compromised 
by the parties. The claim number references' referred to 
herein are the same as in the Petitions for Allowance of 
Claims, and copies of all such claims showing the number 
references in the bottom right-hand corner of the first page 
thereof are attached hereto and by this reference made a part 
hereof. 
DATED THIS day of , 1988. 
Kerry M. Heinz, individually 
J. Sherman Peterson, individually 
Collier, Heinz and Associates 
By. 





Roanoke - Whitesides 
Decatur 
WDR - Roanoke 
La Palma Shopping Center Associates 
Academy Square Land Association 
Academy Square Association 
CHA Trust 
Decatur Shopping Center Associates 
Encinitas Shopping Center Associates 
Foothills Shopping Center Associates 
Franklin Shopping Center Associates 
Gateway West Shopping Center 
Associates 
Hickory Shopping Center Associates 
King Shopping Center Associates 
La Palma Shopping Center Associates 
Oak Grove Shopping Center Associates 
Palmer Shopping Center Associates 
Pinal County Shopping Center 
Associates 
Pinebrook Shopping Center Associates 
Riverside Shopping Center Association 
Riverview Shopping Center Associates 
S C M & M Shopping Center Associates 
Sierra Vista Shopping Center 
Associates 
Sincerely Yours 
South Main Shopping Center 
Associates 
Southwest Virginia Shopping Center 
Associates 
Village Square Shopping Center 
Associates 
Whiteside Shopping Center Associates 
By. 
Kerry M. Heinz, General Partner 
for and on behalf of each of the 
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James A. Collier 
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[Copies of Claims to be Attached By 
Legal Counsel for the Parties.] 
EXHIBIT F 
Robert W. Edwards (A0961) 
EDWARDS & McCOY 
Attorneys for the Estate of 
James A. Collier 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6500 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of the : ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Estate of JAMES A- COLLIER, : WITH PREJUDICE OF 
CERTAIN CLAIMS 
Deceased. : Probate No. 2890 
Based upon the Stipulation and Motion for Dismissal on 
file herein, the Court being duly advised in the premises 
thereof and good cause appearing therefor, and upon joint 
motion of all the parties and their attorneys, 
THE COURT HEREBY ENTERS ITS ORDER as follows: 
1. The claim identified in Claim No. 18 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and J. Sherman Peterson as claimants in that certain 
Petition for Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 1980, is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to bear 
their own respective costs incurred therein. 
2. The claim identified in Claim No. 20 with J. 
Sherman Peterson as a claimant in that certain Petition for 
Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 1980, is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to bear their own 
respective costs incurred therein. 
3. The claim identified in Claim No. 21 with Collier, 
Heinz and Associates, Kerry M. Heinz and J* Sherman Peterson 
as claimants in that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims 
dated September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
The parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
4. The claim identified in Claim No. 23 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Gateway West (also known as Gateway West Shopping 
Center Associates) as claimants in that certain Petition for 
Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 1980, is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to bear their own 
respective costs incurred therein. 
5. The claim identified in Claim No. 24 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Hickory (also known as Hickory Shopping Center 
Associates) as claimants in that certain Petition for 
Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 1980, is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to bear their own 
respective costs incurred therein. 
6. The claim identified in Claim No. 26 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Kings (also known as Kings Shopping Center 
Associates) as claimants in that certain Petition for 
Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 1980, is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to bear their own 
respective costs incurred therein. 
7. The claim identified in Claim No. 28 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Palmer Plaza (also known as Palmer Plaza Shopping 
Center Associates) as claimants in that certain Petition for 
Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 1980, is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to bear their own 
respective costs incurred therein. 
8. The claim identified in Claim No. 29 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Roanoke-Whitesides (also known as Roanoke-
Whitesides Shopping Center Associates) as claimants in that 
certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 
1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to 
bear their own respective costs incurred therein. 
9. The claim identified in Claim No. 30 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Decatur (also known as Decatur Shopping Center 
Associates) as claimants in that certain Petition for 
Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 1980, is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to bear their own 
respective costs incurred therein. 
10. The claim identified in Claim No. 31 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and WDR-Roanoke (also known as WDR-Roanoke Shopping 
Center Associates) as claimants in that certain Petition for 
Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 1980, is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to bear their own 
respective costs incurred therein. 
11. The claim identified in Claim No. 32 with Collier, 
Heinz and Associates and Kerry M. Heinz as claimants in that 
certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 
1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to 
bear their own respective costs incurred therein. 
12. The claim identified in Claim No. 34 with Collier, 
Heinz and Associates and Kerry M. Heinz as claimants in that 
certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 
1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to 
bear their own respective costs incurred therein. 
13. The claim identified in Claim No. 38 with Collier, 
Heinz and Associates and Kerry M. Heinz as claimants in that 
certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 
1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to 
bear their own respective costs incurred therein. 
14. The claim identified in Claim No. 39 with Kerry M. 
Heinz as a claimant in that certain Petition for Allowance of 
Claims dated September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. The parties are to bear their own respective 
costs incurred therein. 
15. The claim identified as Claim No. 41 with Kerry M. 
Heinz as a claimant in that certain Petition for Allowance of 
Claims dated September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. The parties are to bear their own respective 
costs incurred therein. 
16. The claim identified in Claim No. 43 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and La Palma Shopping Center Associates as claimants in 
that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated September 
15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The parties 
are to bear their own respective costs incurred therein. 
17. The claim identified in Claim No. 44 with Kerry M. 
Heinz as a claimant in that certain Petition for Allowance 
of Claims dated September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. The parties are to bear their own respective 
costs incurred therein. 
18. The claim identified in Claim No. 45 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Academy Square Land Association as claimants in 
that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated September 
15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The parties 
are to bear their own respective costs incurred therein. 
19. The claim identified in Claim No. 46 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Academy Square Association as claimants in that 
certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 
1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to 
bear their own respective costs incurred therein. 
20. The claim identified in Claim No. 50 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and CHA Trust as claimants in that certain Petition for 
Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 1980, is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to bear their own 
respective costs incurred therein. 
21. The claim identified in Claim No. 51 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Decatur Shopping Center Associates as claimants in 
that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated September 
15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The parties 
are to bear their own respective costs incurred therein. 
22. The claim identified in Claim No. 52 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Encinitas Shopping Center Associates as claimants 
in that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated 
September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The 
parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
23. The claim identified in Claim No. 53 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Foothills Shopping Center Associates as claimants 
in that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated 
September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The 
parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
24. The claim identified in Claim No. 54 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Franklin Shopping Center Associates as claimants 
in that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated 
September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The 
parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
25. The claim identified in Claim No. 56 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Gateway West Shopping Center Associates as 
claimants in that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims 
dated September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
The parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
26. The claim identified in Claim No. 57 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Hickory Shopping Center Associates as claimants in 
that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated 
September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The 
parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
27. The claim identified in Claim No. 58 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and King Shopping Center Associates (also known as 
Kings Shopping Center Associates) as claimants in that 
certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 
1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to 
bear their own respective costs incurred therein. 
28. The claim identified in Claim No. 59 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and La Palma Shopping Center Associates as claimants in 
that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated 
September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The 
parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
29. The claim identified in Claim No. 63 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Oak Grove Shopping Center Associates as claimants 
in that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated 
September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The 
parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
30. The claim identified in Claim No. 64 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Palmer Shopping Center Associates as claimants in 
that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated 
September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The 
parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
31. The claim identified in Claim No. 65 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Pinal County Shopping Center Associates as 
claimants in that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims 
dated September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
The parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
32. The claim identified in Claim No. 66 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Pinebrook Shopping Center Associates as claimants 
in that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated 
September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The 
parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
33. The claim identified in Claim No. 68 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Riverside Shopping Center Association (also known 
as Riverside Shopping Center Associates) as claimants in that 
certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 
8 
1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to 
bear their own respective costs incurred therein. 
34. The claim identified in Claim No. 69 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Riverview Shopping Center Associates.as claimants 
in that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated 
September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The 
parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein* 
35. The claim identified in Claim No. 71 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and S C M & M Shopping Center Associates as claimants 
in that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated 
September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The 
parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
36. The claim identified in Claim No. 72 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Sierra Vista Shopping Center Associates as 
claimants in that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims 
dated September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
The parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
37. The claim identified in Claim No. 73 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Sincerely Yours as claimants in that certain 
Petition for Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 1980, is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to bear 
their own respective costs incurred therein. 
38. The claim identified in Claim No. 74 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and South Main Shopping Center Associates as claimants 
in that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated 
September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The 
parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
39. The claim identified in Claim No. 75 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Southwest Virginia Shopping Center Associates as 
claimants in that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims 
dated September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
The parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
40. The claim identified in Claim No. 76 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Village Square Shopping Center Associates as 
claimants in that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims 
dated September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
The parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
41. The claim identified in Claim No. 78 with Kerry M. 
Heinz and Whiteside Shopping Center Associates as claimants 
in that certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated 
September 15, 1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The 
parties are to bear their own respective costs incurred 
therein. 
10 
42. The claim identified in Claim No. 79 with Collier, 
Heinz and Associates and Kerry M. Heinz as claimants in that 
certain Petition for Allowance of Claims dated September 15, 
1980, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to 
bear their own respective costs incurred therein. 
DATED this day of , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE: 
Attorney for Claimants and Petitioners 
Attorney for Estate of James A. Collier 
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EXHIBIT G 
Robert W. Edwards (A0961) 
EDWARDS & MCCOY 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MYRNE MOSS COLLIER, personal 
representative of the James 
A. Collier Estate, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KERRY M. HEINZ, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION AND 
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C85-7349 
Judge 
STIPULATION AND MOTION 
Plaintiff Myrne Moss Collier, personal representative of 
the James A. Collier Estate, and defendant Kerry M. Heinz, 
hereby stipulate through their respective undersigned counsel 
and move this Court pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to dismiss the above entitled case with 
prejudice upon the grounds that said dispute has been fully 
settled between the parties. Said parties further stipulate 
that each shall bear its own costs and attorney's fees. 
1 
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DATED t h i s d a y o f 
EDWARDS & MCCOY 
., 1988, 
By: . 
ROBERT W. EDWARDS 
Attorneys for Myrne Moss Collier, 
Personal representative of the 
James A. Collier Estate 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
By: 
CARY D. JONES 
Attorneys for Kerry M. Heinz 
EXHIBIT H 
Robert W. Edwards (A0961) 
EDWARDS & MCCOY 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MYRNE MOSS COLLIER, personal 
representative of the Janes 
A. Collier Estate, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KERRY M. HEINZ, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No. C85-7349 
Judge 
ORPER 
WHEREAS the parties to the above entitled case have 
stipulated and moved this Court to dismiss the above entitled 
action with prejudice? 
AND FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN: 
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that the above entitled 
action is dismissed with prejudicer each of the parties to 
bear their own costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED this day of , 1988. 




























Randall S. Feil (A 1052) 
Edwards, McCoy & Kennedy 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MYRNE M. COLLIER, as personal 
representative of the Estate 
of James A. Collier, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KERRY M. HEINZ, an 
individual, SOUTHWEST 
VIRGINIA SHOPPING CENTER 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah limited 
partnership, and KERRY M. 
HEINZ as general partner of 




KENNETH J. HANNI 
Civil No. 890901722CV 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss. 
I, Kenneth J. Hanni, being first duly sworn, say as 
follows: 
1. I am an attorney and a member of the Utah State Bar 
Association, and I have been co-counsel for the Estate of 
James A. Collier (the "Estate") since its inception. By 
reason of my involvement as co-counsel of the Estate, I have 
personal knowledge of the following matters. I am an adult, 
and I am competent to testify, and if called upon would 
testify, to the truth of the matters set forth herein. 
2. One of my responsibilities as co-counsel has been 
to monitor the interests of the Estate in various partnerships 
in which the decedent was a general or limited partner prior 
to his death. 
3. I know that subsequent to the commencement of 
probate proceedings for the Estate, Heinz and many of the 
partnerships in which Heinz and James A. Collier had been 
partners filed certain claims against the Estate in said 
probate proceedings relating to matters in which both Heinz 
and James A. Collier were involved. 
4. On behalf of the Estate, I was directly involved for 
many years in negotiations with the successor general partner, 
Kerry M. Heinz, concerning these partnership interests. 
Subsequently, Robert W. Edwards, co-counsel for the Estate, 
took over these negotiations in an attempt to settle many 
controversies that had arisen. 
5. On March 22, 1988, by a transmittal letter dated 
March 15, 1988, I received, on behalf of the Estate, two 
checks from Southwest Virginia Shopping Center Associates: 
check #1853 in the amount of $53,080.11 for the general 
partner interest, and check #1858 in the amount of $48,415.94 
for the limited partnership interest, together with a summary 
of cash distributions. Copies of the transmittal and summary 
are attached hereto as Exhibit A to this Affidavit. 
6. I had several questions concerning this distribution 
and discussed them with Robert W. Edwards, co-counsel for the 
Estate. 
7. On several occasions during March and April, 1988, 
I called Michael Semken, a certified public accountant working 
for Kerry M. Heinz and the various partnerships in which the 
Estate had an interest, in order to determine the basis for 
the payments made to the Estate. 
8. On June 2, 1988, I received from Michael Semken a 
copy of his work papers dated January 20, 1988, showing the 
calculations of the amounts available for distribution to the 
limited partners and general partners of Southwest Virginia 
Shopping Center Associates. A copy of said work papers is 
attached as Exhibit B to this Affidavit. These work papers 
included a deduction of $194,220.98 for what was described in 
the work papers as a "Receivable from General Partners," of 
which $97,110.49 was charged to the Estate. Thus if 
defendants were not entitled to make this offset, the Estate 
should have received an additional $97,110.49 when it received 
the checks from defendants on March 22, 1988. 
9. Any deduction from the distribution to the Estate 
for any "Receivable from General Partners" was not correct 
because of the provisions of the Settlement Agreement dated 
February 12, 1988. I immediately discussed this deduction 
with Robert W. Edwards. I also attempted on several 
subsequent occasions to discuss my concerns with Michael 
Semken, but I have received no response. 
10. I have read the foregoing and know the contents 
thereof to be true and correct of my own personal knowledge. 
Dated this - day of August, 1989. 
i . . . . . . . .*•- i \- ~-. . -. 
Kenneth J. Hanni 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
August, 1989. 
My commission expires: 
WENDY D'. Horru -... 
2585 Wdshiro Cirde 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 ; 
My Commission Expires I 
^October 25,1992 I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this // day of August, 1989, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT 
OF KENNETH J. HANNI to be hand delivered to the following: 
Clark W. Sessions, Esq. 
Sessions & Moore 
505 East 200 South #400 




{Qcwet, ^n&nj, JO?IC/' S&teoaa/cJ EXHIBIT A 
March 15, 1988 
Estate of James A. Collier 
c/o Ken Hanni 
Post Office Box 3450 
City, UT 84110-3450 
Re: Southwest Virginia Shopping Center 
Dear Mr. Hanni: 
Southwest Virginia Shopping Center Associates was made up of 
two shopping centers. These centers were sold independently 
to different buyers. Cave_Springs was sold to the McNeil 
Company in 1981, with a balloon payment due in 1989. The 
balloon has been paid off early. 
Enclosed is an accounting of the money received and how it 
was applied. The enclosed check represents your share of the 
distribution. If you refer to the accounting of the sale 
done by Webb, Anderson and Company in December 1981, you can 
compare this distribution with the one projected for 198 9. 
If you have any questions concerning this distribution, 
please feel free to be in touch with our office. 
Sincerely. 
SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA SHOPPING CENTER ASSOCIATES 





Enclosure: Check Number 01853 - $53,080. 11 »•'< 
01858 - $48, 415. 94 . • 
w—'• tA - o V ^ ll 
1849 WEST NORTH TEMPLE / SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84116 / (801) 595-6600 
SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA SHOPPING CENTER ASSOCIATES 
Cash Distribution 
March 1988 
CASH DISTRIBUTION 1,429,000 
Capital Contributions 1,312,268 
Return of Capital thru 1987 ( 440,000) 


















4 i L < 
i. ( 
V— • ^s* 1 3 3 V l U . ^ 








































. . ! 
-H j>tsr/L/£uTMLL 





--.:-~— .i_~ 5 
: • ! 4 - 1 -
l I sivu>ioQ> 
j^k_l V— - II- - M*W • -I"-








.MOI l / ^ i 
! ' I 
"T -























t ; if t 1 ! 





if U I ! ! 
i . i 
. ! 
. !.. 




































; i \\f?z\ib.i<& 2 
Idfctt AM/LAUL 
•f- e&d 
- 1 . 
<: 
wzicoo'so'. 
/DO OO0.00 l 7 
xL 
4Z7fi9'P\0*i • i 
- f — 




- - I 
- -




' 4 % 
I \¥\tf> 
zz i£4iw CT7 3**> H 
.J; 
28 











41 - J ]-.~i 





_LL L- j - i 
r 
i p/si£/4trr/<>A/ tf.. l*tyjfel£.f. 
:&* / 
/ % ! « * 
i ff 





-t ^ T ' 
MfytloM ft</zz.o 
-I- J * . l < ? 
ft 
JL£! 
//&S3zltt 774 n,7o /4¥l>Dl2' 
— u ~ - ( ( \~~> ^ w , v / r- y / » / 
\ 1 ! 
f. w 
"1 1 _ 
i * ! 
1 :. i: : 
21- • - ! 
3 i 





:: • i 


































>. _ \ 
j 









- ! - -j 
• i 
! - J 
i 
! 















3 9 ! ; 1 | 
40 
1 i ;. MM£^( j 
1. ' ; \^XJLMJC\S 
. 
! 
j n • ! ' 
i! 1 
1
 j ! i| 1 
: J ; .; 




I i h 1 
j 1 !i I 
• i 
. 










\ \ \S '•• \ ! ' 
l' i 







i i ) 
1 i 
, i 
i — . 
i . 
! ! ! 
1 
! 
_ . |. . 
i 
i 













j 1 ' 




 T L- T 
1 1 1 
i ; l [ 
'41 
i 1 
! . .- L 
! • : ! 
i : 11 
P : • 1 ! 
t; * • * 
• ! - ! 
1 1 
i , : 1 i 
-, 
.1. 1.. 1 
j -f-«—1~t-
i 1 * 
!
 1 ' 
1 — t 
1
 ' I 
t 
- i _ . 
j 1 
I 
i l i 




i 1 i 
4 -] 
i 
f- - • 
-H 1 1 1 
1 






• • F * 5 ! 
1 ; Utf\ i * I : MA 
! \ nn\ 
i l . . i . 






! i j 




i i ! i 
1 • I • 
1 -tJ -
! I 1 
i ' 1 
1 i 1 
J J 1 ' 
--1-4 
I . I 
• ' j 1 . 
1 • J I I 
j .
 4 )_J 
' i 
I — l » 
1 1 1 
4 ' 
•\V 1 
1 1 ' 
. 1 1 i 
! M i 
..J . 
: • • i 
. ! 1 i " 1 i 
! . • ! • 1 ! 
' I | 1 
















11 w&nl s . • ! : 
1 s\l*Lnx\ ' ! : 








4 - » 
1 
! i i 
\ • • 
1 
i 
i "T ~ 
j 1 
1 ': 
. i . -
1 ! 
! . . . . 
i i 
i i ! 
M . 
• — 1 •» -
! I-
1 ' I -
I 
!
 I i •• • 
! | ;' 
• j 
j ; fp 
i 
i 
J . - . ; 




l i i 
i 
i r1 








J i . 
i 
• 
4 - 4 . - 1 -
I i 
I * * 
1 ~* 
i 





1 - 1 - - J 




I - -4 
« 
f j , — 
! i ' 
i : 4 ! 






1 . 1 s 




1 ! i 
i , t 
U:.i... 
. . . 
. . | . 11 












I , I 
1 I ! 
i ' ' i 
; i • ' 
i ' 
i : > 
1
 i , 
I 
; 1 
i —-• 1 - • • i 
i 










. ! - ! 
: l_.i 
I ' ! 
• • t ' . , i 
I 
1 ! | ' 
i 
1 
*cr t i / <~ 






















































\ 4-4 - P 
I i *V SO O 0 04 




/c4 Atc^tJr^ithi^s^Ui l^M^fffii^L - i 
k3J/lZfe8po' ^ | S ^ , 
jwifo: J 




V i A ' i 
__ 4 -
i i 
-t-r- ! _ i _ | . jl_J._i.__ 








I — 4— 
I 




















i . l 
- I 
I t 
I I 
